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Making sense of students’ sense making through the lens of the 
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In this paper we use the evolving framework of structural abstraction as a theoretical 
lens to investigate how mathematics major university students understand the limit 
concept of a sequence. To this aim the theoretical framework is outlined and previous 
empirical data on one individual’s partial (re-)construction of a convergent sequence 
is revisited. In doing so, we provide insights in how students, who consider the formal 
definition of a mathematical concept as one of the components of their concept 
image, involve it into their overall mathematical discourse when building new 
knowledge. Deeper analysis also reveals unsettled issues about structural abstraction 
and provides new directions for advancing our understanding of this kind of 
abstraction.  
Keywords: generic representation, mathematical learning, sense making, structural 
abstraction, theory development.  
INTRODUCTION   
There has been a growing interest in revisiting the notion of abstraction in 
mathematics education. Recent contributions from socio-cultural perspectives on the 
learning of mathematics have strengthened our theoretical understanding and framed 
our empirical investigation on abstraction in knowing and learning mathematics, as 
Hershkowitz, Schwarz, and Dreyfus’ (2001) abstraction in context approach and 
Noss and Hoyles’ (1996) situated abstraction approach indicated. With regard to 
cognitive approaches on abstraction in mathematics education, Scheiner (2016) 
observed that the literature demonstrated substantial progress in explicating the 
significance of Piaget’s (1977/2001) reflective abstraction in mathematical concept 
construction, the kind of abstraction that is often described in terms of forming a 
(structural) concept from an (operational) process (see Dubinsky, 1991; Gray & Tall, 
1994; Sfard, 1991). However, in the past, the literature rarely explored differences in 
cognitive processes with regard to whether the primary focus is on the actions 
(abstraction from actions) or on the objects (abstraction from objects). The former 
takes place on the actions on objects, in particular, individual’s reflections on actions 
on known objects; the latter takes place on the objects themselves, in particular, 
paying attention to the properties and structures inherent in those objects. However, 
Piaget considered abstraction from actions as the only form of abstraction for 
mathematical epistemology; separating it from abstraction from objects. Given these 
historical origins of our field, it is not surprising that the literature reveals a bias 
towards abstraction from actions as the dominating form of abstraction in knowing 
and learning mathematics. 
  
Only recently, abstraction from objects has attracted attention as a form of abstraction 
that provides an account for the complex cognitive processes compatible with 
students’ sense-making strategy of ‘giving meaning’ (Scheiner, 2016; Scheiner & 
Pinto, 2014). An important contribution within abstraction from objects has been 
provided by Mitchelmore and White (2007) who investigated empirical abstraction 
in learning elementary mathematics drawing on Skemp’s (1986) conception of 
abstraction. Their approach goes beyond Piaget’s idea of empirical abstraction, as 
their understanding of abstraction accounts for the similarities of the underlying 
structures rather than the superficial (or external) characteristics of objects, as Piaget 
did. While Mitchelmore and White (2007) considered physical objects, Scheiner 
(2016) described a framework of a kind of abstraction, namely structural abstraction, 
that takes place on mental objects, and, even more important, considers 
complementarity of diverse features of mathematical objects instead of their 
similarity. The notion of structural abstraction has been introduced by Tall (see 2013) 
as a form of long term development in mathematical thinking with a focus on the 
properties of objects. Scheiner (2016) and Scheiner and Pinto (2014) further 
elaborated Tall’s notion of structural abstraction to draw out the cognitive 
architecture of this kind of abstraction, accounting for both an objects-structure 
perspective and a knowledge-structure perspective. The data of a previous study 
(Pinto, 1998) was revisited, offering in the present paper a context for insights into 
students’ sense-making of formal mathematics through the lens of the structural 
abstraction framework. Reinterpreting the data resulted in, and still contributes to, an 
evolving framework that may serve as a potentially useful tool in analyzing cognitive 
processes in mathematics learning with students’ particular sense-making strategies 
that have not been captured by abstraction-from-actions approaches.  
In this paper, we build upon previous research using the evolving framework of 
structural abstraction in providing insights in students’ mathematical concept 
construction compatible with their sense-making strategy of ‘giving meaning’ 
(Scheiner, 2016; Scheiner & Pinto, 2014). Particularly, we take the revision of a case 
study of a student, called Chris, as a point of reference (Scheiner & Pinto, 2014) – a 
first-year undergraduate mathematics student, who “consistently understood [the 
formal concept] by just reconstructing it from the concept image” (Pinto, 1998). The 
object of consideration in this paper is another student, called Colin, who – similar to 
Chris – ‘gave meaning’ to the formal content. We begin this paper by sketching the 
structural abstraction framework and the research methodology of our project. The 
selected instances from Colin’s case do not only highlight the analytical power of the 
structural abstraction framework but also indicate profitable directions for its 
advancement. It is important to note that the overall agenda in developing a 
theoretical framework of structural abstraction is not to challenge or explain ideas 
presented in an original work or to contrast and compete with recent approaches in 
mathematics education but to theorize about, to provide deeper meaning to older 
ideas, and to take them forward in ways not conceived yet.  
  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Structural abstraction is proposed as embedded in a cognitive architecture that takes 
place both on the objects-structures and on the knowledge-structures. It has a dual 
nature: (1) complementarizing the meaningful aspects and the structure underlying 
specific objects falling under a particular mathematical concept, and (2) promoting 
the growth of coherent and complex knowledge structures through restructuring of 
the knowledge system gained through the former process.  
From the objects-structure perspective, we assume that the meaning of a concept is 
almost always contained in a unity of meaningful components of a variety of specific 
objects that fall under the particular concept. For the (socially constructed) meaning 
of a mathematical concept we draw on Frege’s (1892) observation that the meaning is 
not directly accessible through the concept itself but through objects that fall under 
the concept. In this sense, we cannot take as absolute the ‘complete construction’ of 
the meaning of the concept. Rather than trying to draw a sharp line between whether 
an individual has (or has not) constructed the whole meaning of a mathematical 
concept, or to elaborate stages of objects-structure development, we pay particular 
attention to partial constructions of the concept that students develop, and how they 
make use of them in constructing new knowledge. In our view of the structural 
abstraction framework, a concretizing process is demanded to particularize 
meaningful components and the underlying structure of an object falling under the 
mathematical concept. Concretizing may occur through contextualization that is, 
placing object(s) in different specific contexts. Structural abstraction, then, means 
(mentally) structuring aspects and the underlying structure of these specific objects. 
In contrast to an empiricist view whose conceptual unity relies on the commonality of 
elements, it is the interrelatedness of diverse elements that creates unity. Thus, the 
core mechanism of structural abstraction is complementarizing rather than seeking 
for similarity. In addition, we suggest that, in the complementarizing process, a 
representation may be developed that is used generically for several other instances, 
and, in doing so, may provide a theoretical structure in constructing the meaningful 
components of the objects. Here we draw on Yopp and Ely’s (2016) insightful 
contribution indicating that what makes an example generic has not only to do with 
whether the example is a carrier of the general but also with the actions performed on 
it – a lesson that Balacheff (1988) tried to teach long ago.  
For students who ‘give meaning’ such ‘representations of’ are used generically as 
‘representations for’ sense-making in mathematics. This shift from establishing a 
representation of a concept to using this representation generically for constructing 
and reconstructing the concept in new contexts, could be described in terms of 
shifting from a ‘model of’ to a ‘model for’ (Streefland, 1985). Models are, in this 
sense, intermediate in abstractness between ‘the abstract’ and ‘the concrete’. This 
means that in the beginning of a learning process a model is constituted that supports 
the ‘ascending from the abstract to the concrete’ as described by Davydov (see 
1972/1990). Davydov’s strategy of ascending from the abstract to the concrete draws 
  
the transition from the general to the particular in the sense that learners initially seek 
out a primary general structure, and, in further progress, deduce multiple particular 
features of objects using that structure as their mainstay. The crucial aspect in this 
approach is Ilyenkov’s (1982) observation that “the concrete is realized in thinking 
through the abstract” (p. 37). The key feature within the objects-structure perspective, 
however, lays in the idea that specific objects falling under a particular concept 
mutually complement each other, so that the abstractness of each of them, taken 
separately, is overcome. In this sense, and in line with a dialectical perspective 
described by Ilyenkov (1982) but different from empiricist approaches, structural 
abstraction is a movement towards complementarity of diverse aspects that creates 
conceptual unity among objects. 
From the knowledge-structure perspective, we take the view that knowledge is a 
complex system of many kinds of knowledge elements and structures. Structural 
abstraction implies a process of restructuring and expanding the knowledge system, 
consisting of such ‘pieces of knowledge’ that have been constructed through the 
processes described above. The cognitive function of structural abstraction is to 
facilitate the assembly of more complex knowledge structures. The guiding 
philosophy of this approach is rooted in the assumption that learners acquire 
mathematical concepts initially on their backgrounds of existing domain-specific 
conceptual knowledge through progressive integration of previous concept images 
and/or by the insertion of a new discourse alongside existing concept images. 
The reanalysis of empirical data gained from Pinto’s (1998) study has shown that 
students, who give meaning, build a representation of the concept and, at the same 
time, use it generically for reconstructing the concept in other contexts – such as in 
verbal recovering the formal definition. The analysis also showed that students 
generically used representations of the concept to build pieces of knowledge. To put 
it in other words, the representations are actively taken as representations for 
producing new knowledge and sense-making of mathematics. This mental shift from 
‘representations of’ to ‘representations for’ may indicate a degree of awareness of the 
meaningful components and a level of complexity of the knowledge system (Scheiner 
& Pinto, 2014). In this paper, we discuss one students’ non-linear knowing and 
learning development of the limit concept of a sequence.  
RESEARCH PURPOSE 
The purpose of the paper is twofold: (a) refining and extending the theoretical 
framework through paying particular attention to eventually unsettled issues about 
structural abstraction, and (b) providing further insights in its potential power for the 
analysis of an individual’s partial construction of the limit concept of a sequence, 
consistent with his sense-making strategy. In doing so, we focus on those aspects of 
the learning phenomena that are illuminated by using the structural abstraction 
framework (and that have not been noticed before). Thus, the framework functions 
both as a tool for research and as an object of research, a distinction already made by 
  
Assude, Boero, Herbst, Lerman, and Radford (2008). Our agenda is driven by re-
examining an earlier study (Pinto, 1998) that identified a sense-making strategy of 
formal mathematics that has not fully been captured by abstraction-from-actions 
approaches in the literature on knowing and learning mathematics. The original data 
were collected taking an inductive approach throughout two academic terms during 
students’ first-year at a university in England, through classroom observation field 
notes and transcriptions of semi-structural individual interviews. Interviews took 
place every two weeks with eleven students in total. A cross-sectional analysis of 
three pairs of students resulted in an identification of two prototypical sense-making 
strategies: ‘extracting meaning’ and ‘giving meaning’. 
“Extracting meaning involves working within the content, routinizing it, using it, and 
building its meaning as a formal construct. Giving meaning means taking one’s personal 
concept imagery as a starting point to build new knowledge.” (Pinto, 1998, pp. 298-299) 
The latter strategy is the object of our study. In this paper, we selected instances from 
the available data of the case study of a particular student, called Colin. 
SELECTED INSTANCES FROM A CASE STUDY 
At the beginning of his first course on real analysis, Colin expressed, in his first 
interview, the formal definition of the limit of a sequence as follows: 
 
(Pinto, 1998, p. 201) 
His partial reconstruction of the formal concept definition of limit is a productive 
formulation (in a sense that it works in various contexts) of a property of a 
convergent sequence. His sense-making is coherent with his written definition: 
Umm ... it means that the difference between … umm … the terms in sequence an and the 
limit gets very very small indeed and it gets below a certain umm pre-determined value. 
[…]. Err ... yes, after you go far enough out in the sequence. (Colin, first interview)  
(Pinto, 1998, p. 203) 
A dynamic view of a sequence as a process, implicit in evoked images such as ‘you 
may go far enough out’, and of the limit concept in terms of ‘getting very small’ are 
both indicated. Images such as ‘arbitrarily small quantities’, or ‘infinitesimals’, which 
are common in secondary school learning settings, are recalled with the use of the 
dynamic language of ‘gets very very small indeed’. This is consistent with results in 
Martinez-Planell, Gonzalez, DiCristina, and Acevedo (2012) on students’ 
understanding of series. The authors focused on whether students were seeing series 
  
as a process without an end or as a sequence of partial sums, as stated by definition; 
and referred to Arnon et al.’s (2014) APOS theory to respond how students may 
construct the notion, by considering a distinction amongst the understandings of the 
concept of a sequence as a list of numbers or as a function defined in natural numbers 
(McDonald, Mathews, & Strobel, 2000). Martinez-Planell et al. (2012) concluded 
that even after formal training, students often think of sequences and series as an 
infinite unending process, and evoke dynamical aspects, as Colin did. 
We approach the phenomena from the perspective of the structural abstraction 
framework and understand that, in line with his personal concept definition, the result 
of Colin’s contextualizing processes resulted in a representation of the limit of a 
sequence as that of a descending curve (see Fig.1):  
... umm, [I] sort of imagine the curve just coming down like this and dipping below a 
point which is epsilon... and this would be N. So as soon as they dip below this point then 
... the terms bigger than this [pointing from N to the right] tend to a certain limit, if you 
make this small enough [pointing to the value of epsilon]. (Colin, first interview) 
(Pinto, 1998, p. 202). 
  
Fig. 1: Colin’s first picture Fig. 2: Colin’s second picture 
Colin accentuated the image of a decreasing sequence by saying “as soon as they dip 
below the point then”. The second picture he drew (see Fig. 2) is based on the idea 
that “convergence could happen from above and below”. In other words, it seems that 
he evoked images of a convergent sequence identifying it with monotonic ones. He 
was able to explore his representations dynamically, interpreting and exploring the 
actions involved in his written definition relying on partial constructions that are 
specific and productive to some familiar contexts. In this light, it seems that Colin has 
interpreted (in the sense of Piaget’s notion of assimilation) new concepts in terms of 
his prior knowledge: 
Umm ... in A’ level we used to … umm … plot sequences and generally you might get a 
sequence like this and ... it would tend down to a value or something. … the little bit I had 
done at A-level I just sort of settled into it quite well… (Colin, first interview) 
(Pinto, 1998, p. 203) 
Thus, from the objects-structure perspective, Colin’s partial reconstruction of a 
convergent sequence still related to a descending function or sequence, in a context 
  
where a formal discourse is inserted. From the knowledge-structure perspective, his 
representation of a convergent sequence was generically used as a representation for 
constructing knowledge, as those students who ‘give meaning’ did. On the one hand, 
his representation of a convergent sequence was productive, as many times he sensed 
when results and claims were true. On the other hand, many statements became self-
evident for Colin while his earlier mathematical discourse still was not 
recontextualized within the formal experience, as when he was asked to prove: 
If an→1  , prove that there exists N ∈ IN  such that an > 34  for all n > IN .  
Colin said: ‘It seemed to be a silly question that … if  an  tends to  then if you question 
when an  is greater than 34  …this is a bound, it seems … I don’t know why.’ (Colin, third 
interview) 
(Pinto, 1998, p. 221) 
Colin’s representation of a convergent sequence and its limit, which was coherent 
with his sense-making and his written definition, is a potential conflict factor (Tall & 
Vinner, 1991) concerning its use and the formal discourse. It did not enable him to 
produce a formal proof. Here, other than seeing the formal content as demanding, it is 
its complementary aspect that matters. Colin eventually noticed the new discourse 
introduced by the formalism as increasingly conflicting with his sense-making of the 
theory. In many occasions he ignored it and simply added it as an information: 
There are certain things that ... I think they’re okay and I just learn that, it’s sort of that’s 
defined to be that ... ... (Colin, seventh interview) 
(Pinto, 1998, p. 205) 
In synthesis, in many contexts and situations, students may activate the various 
partial constructions productively. Such an attitude could be common; but in Colin’s 
case, various issues related to recontextualization of his concept image seem to miss. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we presented data showing that a student, called Colin, built partial 
constructions of a convergent sequence that he used as representations of the concept. 
Such use was productive to particular contexts, but remained unproductive in others; 
for instance, to deal with formal mathematics. Colin could perceive that a statement is 
true, based on the properties of the concept he observed and concretized in a 
representation that he used generically (see Yopp & Elly, 2016), as a representation 
for building knowledge. Using his representation of the limit concept as a ‘definition’ 
Colin was able to evoke formal results, although he was unable to make deductions. 
Colin’s awareness of the formal requirements in the new context at university was not 
immediate. His description of the natural flow of his transition from school to 
university, expressed during his first interview, indicates that he did not perceive that 
the concretized knowledge he learned at school and the formal context at university 
were already in conflict. As the course progressed, he was gradually conscious of 
  
conflicting aspects in his understanding; though he added new knowledge as 
information rather than (re-)structuring the prior mathematical experience. There are 
students whose sense-making of the mathematics is detached from their learning of 
the institutional knowledge. They deal with those as if sense-making and institutional 
knowledge were compartmentalized knowledge structures (see Vinner, 1991, p. 70). 
What strikes us in the selected instances of Colin’s case study was the cohesion in his 
sense-making and in learning the formal mathematics concept. Coherence amongst 
students’ sense-making and their (re-)construction of the formal content has been 
proven to be a central characteristic of those students who ‘give meaning’. 
From the objects-structures perspective of the structural abstraction framework, the 
aspect of ‘complementarizing’ meaningful components reflects the idea that whether 
an individual has ‘grasped’ the meaning of a concept can only be considered in 
specific contexts. This makes clear that “the subjective nature of understanding […] 
is not […] an all-or-nothing state” (Skemp, 1986, p. 43). A comparison with Chris’ 
case (Scheiner & Pinto, 2014), another student who ‘gave meaning’, shows that 
although Chris did not ‘have’ all relevant meaningful components at hand, he was 
able – using his ‘generic representation’ – to generate some of them at need. The 
growing complexity of his representation of the convergence of a sequence, gradually 
constructed in particular settings, served as a representation for reconstructing and 
recontextualizing the limit concept in the formal context. We argue that Colin’s 
understanding of a convergent sequence must increase in complexity and 
complementarity, which could be achieved through contextualizing as well as 
integrating various constructions; the latter may be promoted by the insertion of new 
mathematical discourses alongside earlier concept images.  
From the knowledge-structures perspective, structural abstraction is a process of 
restructuring the ‘pieces of knowledge’ constructed through contextualizing and 
complementarizing. In using the structure of the representation, some meaningful 
components of the concept may be productively activated in diverse contexts. Such 
use may even allow to generate new knowledge pieces. In both cases, Chris and 
Colin, a shift from a representation of (the convergente sequence) to a representation 
for generating knowledge can be documented. The shift does not result in knowledge 
restructuring per se, as we could identify in Colin’s case. On the other hand, Chris’ 
case suggested that even a ‘representation for’ may be complementarized by new 
knowledge elements, and such a process becomes recursive (Scheiner & Pinto, 2014).  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The structural abstraction framework takes the view that knowledge is an evolving, 
complex, and dynamic system of many kinds of knowledge elements and structures. 
Abstraction is seen as a movement across levels of complementarity and complexity 
(Scheiner, 2016). The case study in Scheiner and Pinto (2014) and the one provided 
in this paper raise directions for advancing our understanding of structural 
abstraction. Both cases reveal (1) a cohesion amongst their sense-making strategy of 
  
giving meaning, and (2) a generic use of their constructed representations to 
reconstruct the limit concept in other and new contexts. Contrasting the two cases 
shows that the two students differed in the degree of complementarity and complexity 
of the representations used. Chris’ representation could be considered as being 
generic in terms of being a carrier of the general (Mason & Pimm, 1984) that he used 
to reconstruct meaningful components at need. Colin’s representation did not allow 
him to do so – maybe due to its degree of complexity and complementarity. Other 
questions to be addressed are raised by the use of representations in knowledge 
structuring – as a tool to reconstruct knowledge, as Chris did, or as an object in place 
of the definitions, maintaining the earlier mathematical discourse, as in Colin’s case.  
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